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ADOPTING A JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH




The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") insures
deposits1 of the national and state banks and thrifts that are its
member institutions. In the event of a bank failure,2 the FDIC
provides insurance coverage to depositors in these institutions up to
the amount of $100,000 per depositor.' When the FDIC carries out its
role as an insurer and takes control of a failed or failing' bank, the
FDIC must preserve the confidence of the individual depositor and
the confidence of the nation in the banking system.5 While depositors'
funds are protected by this insurance fund, it is the full faith and credit
of the United States government, and ultimately of the American
taxpayers, that stand behind the FDIC insurance fund.'
1. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994). Thrifts refer to the following institutions: savings
and loans, buildings and loans, and savings banks. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency
Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 Duke L.J. 469,473 n.7 (1992). Since 1989, bank
and thrift regulation have been treated essentially the same. See id.
2. "Simply put, a bank fails when its liabilities exceed the value of its assets."
Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience 43 (FDIC 1998) [hereinafter
Managing the Crisis].
3. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B).
4. "[A]s a matter of law, a troubled institution is one that has not yet failed but is
in danger of doing so if current trends in its financial condition continue." Michael P.
Malloy, III Banking Law & Regulation § 11.1, at 11.1-11.2 (1994).
5. See Managing the Crisis, supra note 2, at 8. As an insurer of the deposits of
the nation's banks and thrifts the FDIC faces the following challenges:
In the event of institution failures, the FDIC maintains stability and public
confidence in the system by providing the public with ready access to their
insured funds. The FDIC helps ensure the stability of the financial system in
times of stress by providing timely or quick resolution of failed institutions.
This stability helps promote public confidence in the system and restores
liquidity to the economy.
Id at 7-8.
6. See Fred Galves, Might Does Nor Make Right: The Call for Reform of the
Federal Government's D'Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C § 1823(e) Superpowers in
Failed Bank Litigation, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1323, 1333-34 (1996) [hereinafter Galves,
Might Does Not Make Right]; James J. Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American
Taxpayers: Assigning the FDIC's Six Year Statute of Limitations to Third Party
Purchasers, 24 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1169, 1169 (1993); see also Malloy, supra note 4, §
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A financial crisis in the banking industry in the 1980s and 1990s
presented great challenges to the FDIC in its role as an insurer.7 In
response to the crisis, Congress enacted comprehensive legislation
called the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 19898 ("FIRREA") to bolster the FDIC's ability to manage the
billions of dollars in assets of failed and failing banks that fell under
the FDIC's control.9 Courts also expanded the FDIC's common law
powers during the crisis to aid the FDIC in its litigation efforts to
recover upon these assets.10
Courts have analyzed the status of federal subject matter
jurisdiction in actions when the FDIC sells assets once held by a failed
bank to a private party and then leaves the litigation.11 The circuits
are split as to whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under
12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) when the FDIC has withdrawn from an
ongoing litigation by the assignment of its rights to a private party.
This Note explores the issues related to federal court jurisprudence
raised by this split in authority.
Part I provides background on the FDIC and describes the agency's
role when an insured depository institution such as a bank or thrift
becomes financially troubled.12 This part examines the FDIC's
statutory and common law powers that allow the agency to meet its
obligations to the depositors of these insured banks and thrifts.13 Part
II discusses the constitutional dimension of the subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts. Other concerns pertinent to federal
jurisdiction are introduced, including federalism and prudential
concerns such as efficiency and fairness.14 Part II also analyzes §
1819(b)(2)(A), the FDIC's statutory grant of federal jurisdiction. Part
III discusses the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals that created
the legal controversy. This part outlines the distinct approaches of the
minority and majority circuits regarding whether FIRREA allows a
private party that buys assets of a failed bank or thrift from the FDIC
to receive the benefit of the FDIC's federal court jurisdiction.
Relying on federal common law, the majority holds that these private
11.3.2, at 11.21 ("The ultimate liability of the federal government in a situation
involving a failed depository institution is the obligation for insured deposits of the
institution.").
7. See Managing the Crisis, supra note 2, at 6.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2, 12 and 42 U.S.C.).
9. See Managing the Crisis, supra note 2, at 6. Two thousand nine hundred and
twelve (2,912) federally insured depository institutions failed between 1980-1994. See
id. at 4. They held a combined total of $924 billion dollars in assets. See id.
10. See, e.g., Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1349 (noting
that expansion of the FDIC's common law "accelerated" in the 1980s).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part I.A.
13. See discussion infra Parts I.A.-B.
14. See discussion infra Parts II.B.-C.
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parties are assignees of the FDIC and thus inherit the FDIC's federal
jurisdiction under FIRREA. Alternatively, these courts apply the
time-of-filing rule to hold that no jurisdictional defect was created. 16
The minority argues that a plain meaning analysis of FIRREA
supports the opposite conclusion; Congress did not extend its grant of
federal jurisdiction to assignees of the FDIC. 7
Part IV outlines three approaches to the legal controversy based in
federal court jurisprudence and suggests that the proper approach to
the legal controversy must include analysis from a jurisdictional
standpoint. First, this part considers whether it is possible to assign
federal subject matter jurisdiction when it is based upon a party's
federal agency status."8 Second, this part explores the application and
the policy of the time-of-filing rule as a method of resolving the
conflict.19 The third approach presents the question of whether courts
may properly apply the supplemental jurisdiction statute to decide if a
court may exercise jurisdiction over the non-diverse, remaining parties
after the FDIC has exited the ongoing litigation and only state law is
at issue.' In Part V the Note evaluates the merits of all these
approaches. It concludes that Congress should amend FIRREA to
include a grant of federal jurisdiction to these FDIC assignees.
I. THE FDIC
The FDIC supervises troubled depository institutions1 and has the
power to declare that an institution is in default.2 When dealing with
these institutions, the FDIC acts in its corporate capacity as an insurer
and as a conservator or receiver of the bank or thrift.' As a
conservator, the FDIC assumes the day-to-day operations of a
financial institution.24 In contrast, when the FDIC acts as a receiver, it
steps into the shoes of the bank in default and acts as a trustee It
becomes a successor to all rights, titles and powers of the depository
15. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
16. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
17. See infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text.
1& See discussion infra Part IV.A.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4), (6), (9)-(10), (13) (1994).
22. See id. § 1821(c)(4)(A). "[A]s a matter of law a depository institution is failing
only if it has been declared to be so by its primary regulator." Malloy, supra note 4, §
11.1, at 11.2.
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c), (e) (requiring the FDIC to accept appointment as
receiver of a failed bank); see also Malloy, supra note 4, § 11.3.2, at 11.24-11.29
(describing supervision of troubled depository institutions).
24. See Financial Institutions Reform Act of 1989 Conference Report 1 4208 in
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989: P.L 101-73,
103 Stat. 183, as signed by the President on August 9, 1989.
25. See id.; Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1340-41.
2000] 289
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
institution and may even liquidate the institution's assets.26 In its
corporate capacity, the FDIC is responsible for "guaranteeing the
timely funding of insured deposits."'27 To do so, the FDIC must either
pay the depositor's insured claims or "[make] available to each
depositor a transferred deposit in a new insured depository institution
in the same community or in another insured depository institution in
an amount equal to the insured deposit."'
A. Managing Bank Failure
When dealing with either a troubled or a defaulted institution, the
FDIC must pursue a course of action that is both of minimal cost to
the deposit insurance fund and best preserves the value of assets owed
to creditors.2 9 At the same time, the FDIC must minimize disruptions
to bank depositors, such as "avoiding returned checks, lost time value
of money, and loss of confidence associated with the alternative of
closing the failed bank."3 When a troubled institution is not yet in
default, the FDIC must act to avoid the worst possible consequence of
such disruptions, a "bank run," a situation in which depositors
withdraw their accounts from institutions in financial distress and
cause them to become insolvent.
As an alternative to liquidating assets to pay off deposits, the FDIC
frequently engages in a purchase and assumption transaction
("P&A") with an acquirer bank to deal with a failing financial
institution.32 P&As have been called the "favored resolution policy of
the FDIC,' 33 and the FDIC entered into P&As to manage 73.5% of
the 1,617 failed and failing banks during the time period of 1980 to
1994.34 For the FDIC, a P&A is beneficial because it requires less of a
cash outlay from the insurance fund than would be needed to pay off
all insured depositors' claims.35 The acquirer bank expands its
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)-(C), (E).
27. Managing the Crisis, supra note 2, at 6.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(0(1).
29. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring least cost resolution); § 1823(d)(3)(D)
(requiring that sale or disposition of assets by FDIC "maximizes the net present value
return" and "minimizes the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of cases"); §
1821(d)(13)(E) (same, when the FDIC acts as conservator or receiver); Marie T.
Reilly, The FDIC as Holder in Due Course: Some Law and Economics, 1992 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 165, 173.
30. Reilly, supra note 29, at 175.
31. See Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1339.
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c); see generally Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865
(11th Cir. 1982) (describing a P&A).
33. Managing the Crisis, supra note 2, at 14. The term resolution refers to "a
disposition plan for a failed or failing institution." Id. at 3 n.1.
34. See id. at 14.
35. See Reilly, supra note 29, at 175.
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business at low risk and depositors avoid the uncertainty of the closing
and liquidation of a failed bank.36
A P&A has characteristics of a merger- and it also combines
elements of reorganization and liquidation." In a P&A, an acquirer
bank purchases the assets39 and assumes the liabilities, of a failed
bank. The transaction is usually accomplished overnight in order to
preserve the going concern value4 of the failed bank.42 Thus, a P&A
avoids any inconvenience to depositors related to a disruption in
banking services. 43 The FDIC first places the bank into receivership
and sells the "bad"'  assets to the FDIC acting in its corporate
capacity.45 The FDIC then sells the assets of highest banking quality
to the acquirer bank.' As a result, liabilities assumed by the acquirer
bank exceed the purchased assets. The FDIC then pays the acquirer
a premium to make up for the shortfall between the value of the
liabilities the acquirer assumed and the assets the acquirer
purchased.48
B. Congressional Response to Commercial Bank and S&L Crises
During the 1980s, the widespread failure of commercial banks and
the collapse of nationwide savings and loans ("S&L") brought great
public scrutiny to the insurance fund. 9 Between 1980 and 1994, 1,617
36. See Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
37. See Malloy, supra note 4, § 11.32, at 11.27.
38. See Warren L. Dennis & John R. Simon, Litigation with the FDIC and the
RTC: The Evolving D'Oench Doctrine Superpower Defense, 47 Bus. Law. 1319, 1320
(1992).
39. A bank's loan portfolio is its primary asset. See Reilly, supra note 29, at 166.
The portfolio is a bank's rights to receive repayment from borrowers. See id.
40. A bank's liabilities are its deposits. See Malloy, supra note 4, § 11.3.2, at 11.24.
41. Going concern value refers to "the value of the assets of a business as an
operating, active concern, rather than merely as items of property (book value of
assets alone) which would be the case in a liquidation sale. Such value includes
goodwill." Black's Law Dictionary 691 (6th ed. 1990). When a business is purchased,
goodwill is a term that is used to reflect attributes such as "the value of good customer
relations, high employee morale, a well respected business name, etc. which are
expected to result in greater than normal earning power." Id at 694.
42. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir. 1982).
43. See id.
44. In early P&A transactions, acquirer banks only purchased assets of cash and
cash equivalents and the FDIC retained loans, the assets with risk. See Managing the
Crisis, supra note 2, at 15. Later, the FDIC used a put option in their contract with
acquirer banks. See id. With a put option, the acquirer had the opportunity during a
specific timeframe to return to the FDIC those assets that they did not wish to keep.
See id. As a result, "acquirers were able to 'cherry pick' the assets, choosing to keep
only those with market values above book value or assets having little risk, while
returning all other assets." Id.




49. A confluence of factors caused the thrift industry to fail, including, "(i) poorly
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national banks closed or received FDIC financial assistance. 0 During
the same period of time, 1,295 S&Ls closed or received financial
assistance from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation."a The bailout of the S&L industry totaled around $145
billion and has been called "[t]he greatest transfer of wealth outside
armed rebellion in the history of this country. 5 2 The S&L crisis also
came at huge taxpayer expense, with some cost estimates totaling $1
trillion over the next several decades. 3
In 1989, Congress passed FIRREA54 to create a comprehensive
statutory regime for the FDIC to address the crisis in the banking
industry.55 In FIRREA, Congress dissolved the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation and created the Resolution Trust
Corporation, an interim agency, to manage failed savings
associations. 6 Congress strengthened the enforcement powers of
federal regulators of depository institutions and increased civil
sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding depository institutions
and their depositors."
As a receiver and as an insurer, much FDIC litigation involved
collecting upon unacceptable assets that the FDIC acquired from
P&A transactions.5 8 These assets were usually "in bulk, under distress
timed industry-wide deregulation; (ii) the rising interest rate environment of the late
1970s and early 1980s; (iii) poor internal management in the thrift industry; (iv) a lack
of adequate government supervision and regulation; (v) a regional economic collapse,
specifically in the Southwest; and (vi) insider trading and fraud." Anthony C.
Providenti, Jr., Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. 323, 324 (1991).
50. See Managing the Crisis, supra note 2, at 4.
51. See id.
52. Michael Keeley & Toni Scott Reed, "Superpowers" of Federal Regulators:
How the Banking Crisis Created an Entire Generation of Bond Litigation, 31 Tort &
Ins. L.J. 817,825 (1996).
53. See Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1335 n.51.
54. When enacted, FIRREA was the "largest piece of federal legislation affecting
the U.S. banking and financial industry since 1933." Boteler, supra note 6, at 1171
n.22.
55. See Swire, supra note 1, at 473-74.
56. See Deirdre M. Roarty, Note, Resolving Pre-Receivership Claims Against
Failed Savings and Loans: An Unnecessarily Exhausting Experience, 63 Fordham L.
Rev. 2315, 2321 (1995). The RTC was under the general supervision of the FDIC. See
id. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(c) of FIRREA, the RTC exercised the powers
available to the FDIC under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. See id. at 2322.
Because it was a temporary agency, the RTC went into sunset on July 1, 1995, and any
savings and loan association in receivership at that time was assumed by the FDIC.
See id. at 2321-22. "During its lifetime the RTC closed or merged 747 thrifts,
protected 25 million depositor accounts and sold more than $465 billion in assets,
including 120,000 real estate properties." See Keeley & Reed, supra note 52, at 824.
The FDIC is now the agency appointed as receiver of all depository institutions. See
Roarty, supra, at 2322. When this Note refers to the RTC, the conclusions are
applicable to lawsuits involving the FDIC.
57. See Boteler, supra note 6, at 1172.
58. See id. at 1172-73 (discussing the FDIC litigation powers and the financial
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conditions, and... non-performing or otherwise objectionable to a
healthy bank."59 Congress gave the FDIC a repertoire of litigation
powers to aid in the collection of these assets, including the ability to
avoid punitive damages, stay judicial proceedings, and remove
pending cases from state to federal court.60 FIRREA also gave the
FDIC the benefit of the six-year federal statute of limitations. 6' These
statutory protections, along with FDIC common law powers, are often
called "superpowers."'  They all serve to advance the policy of
safeguarding the deposit insurance fund against depletion.'
C. Federal Common Law Powers - D'Oench, Duhme
The FDIC benefited not only from enhanced statutory powers, but
also from the expansive interpretation that courts gave to the FDIC's
common law powers during the financial crises of the commercial
banking and S&L industry. In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC," the
Supreme Court created a federal common law rule of estoppel that
allowed the FDIC to void defenses asserted by debtors that were
based on unrecorded side agreements. 6- The D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine ("D'Oench, Duhme") and related common law powers66
allow the FDIC to defeat debtors' otherwise valid affirmative
defenses, "such as contributory negligence, laches, waiver,
interference with contract performance, failure of consideration and
set off."'67 The Supreme Court created D'Oench, Duhme by relying in
crises in the banking and S&L industries).
59. Reilly, supra note 29, at 176.
60. See Cherie Stephens Bock, Comment, Alive, But Not Quite Kicking: Circuit
Split Illustrates the Progressive Deterioration of the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 42 St.
Louis LJ. 945, 950 (1998).
61. See Barry S. Zisman & Marguerite Woung, Superpowers of the FDIC/RTC
and their Availability to Third Parties, 108 Banking LJ. 516, 517 (1991).
62- See Boteler, supra note 6, at 1170.
63. See Zisman & Woung, supra note 61, at 518.
64. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
65. See Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1327-28.
66. The FDIC protection as a holder in due course ("HDC") is one significant
common law extension of the D'Oench, Duhine doctrine. See Gunter v. Hutcheson,
674 F.2d 862, 868 (11th Cir. 1982). An HDC takes a negotiable instrument free from
all claims and defenses. See Bock, supra note 60, at 952 n.76. The FDIC does not
qualify for holder in due course status as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") for two reasons. First, it does not acquire the failed depository institution's
assets for value in the regular course of business, and second, the UCC provision
exempts bulk sales. See Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6. at 1352.
The rule instead gives HDC status to the FDIC when it acquires a note in a P&A -for
value, in good faith, and without actual knowledge of... fraud." Gunter, 674 F.2d at
873. The I-DC status immunizes the FDIC against defenses including waiver,
estoppel, laches, fraud in the factum, usury and failure of accord and satisfaction. See
J. Michael Echevarria, A Precedent Embalns a Principle: The Erpansion of the
D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 745, 774 (1994); Galves, Might Does
Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1353.
67. See Dennis & Simon, supra note 38, at 1319.
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part on the policy interests of the FDIC as insurer of the nation's
banks.'
D'Oench, Duhme originated from the 1942 Supreme Court case
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.69 The FDIC initiated a lawsuit in
federal court in Missouri to collect on a demand note executed by
D'Oench, Duhme at an Illinois bank.7" The court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the Federal Reserve Act.71 As a defense, D'Oench,
Duhme argued that it executed the note with the understanding that
the note would not be called for payment.7' Although the bank did
not enter this side agreement into its records, the receipts for the
notes memorialized the understanding.7 3 The parties executed the
note so that an earlier, bad loan would appear on the bank's records
as a good asset.74 The secret "side agreement" was asserted as a
defense against the FDIC's suit to collect the note.75
The Supreme Court decided D'Oench, Duhme after Erie v,
Tompkins,76 which dispensed with the application of federal general
common law.77 To justify the creation of federal common law after
Erie,78 the court distinguished Erie, which was a case in diversity79
from D'Oench, Duhme which was a federal question case.80 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, held that federal law provided the
rule of decision and then created a federal common law rule of
estoppel.s Consequently, the Court rejected D'Oench, Duhme's
defense and voided the secret agreement.' Douglas fashioned his
holding in light of the goals animating the Federal Reserve Act, which
were "to protect [the FDIC], and the public funds which it
administers, against misrepresentations as to the securities or other
68. See Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1346 (noting that
D'Oench, Duhme reflected federal policy to insure "integrity" of the FDIC fund).
69. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
70. See id. at 453.
71. See id. at 455-56.
72. See id. at 454.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 456.
75. See id.
76. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
77. See id. at 78.
78. See D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 455.
79. The diversity jurisdiction of the federal court extends to cases between citizens
of different states. See Black's Law Dictionary 477 (6th ed. 1990); infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
81. See D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 459.
82. See id. (affirming judgment to enforce the note despite secret agreement
defense by citing principles such as "the federal policy evidenced in this Act to protect
[the FDIC], a federal corporation, from misrepresentations made to induce or
influence the action of respondent, including misstatements as to the genuineness or
integrity of securities in the portfolios of banks which it insures or to which it makes
loans").
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assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC] insures."' As
additional justification for the need to create this estoppel doctrine,
Justice Douglas noted that "[t]he genuineness of assets ostensibly held
by a bank is certainly germane to a determination of solvency."' The
Supreme Court, therefore, acknowledged the importance of the public
interest in a stable banking industry and a solvent federal insurance
fund when it created common law in the D'Oench, Duhme decision.
D. The Role of Private Parties as Asset Purchasers from the FDIC
Through P&As and bulk sales of assets, the FDIC used private
funds to soften the blow to the insurance fund as a result of the
massive failures in the banking industry. The FDIC and the RTC sold
private parties distressed assets in bulk such as promissory notes and
debt obligations.8s Asset purchasers were comprised of individual
investors, individuals that pooled funds, and institutional investors
such as investment banks, brokerage houses and financial
institutions. 6
Because third party purchasers of assets constitute an essential part
of P&As, some courts have readily extended the benefits of D'Oench,
Duhme to private parties.' This follows the trend of the expansion of
D'Oench, Duhme and related statutory and common lawn
83. Id. at 457.
84. Id. at 460.
85. See Fred Gaves, FDIC and RTC Special Powers in Failed Bank Litigation, 22
Colo. Law. 473, 473 (1993) [hereinafter Galves, Special Powers].
86. See Gaves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1362.
87. See id
88. In 1950, as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Congress codified
various aspects of the D'Oench, Duhme decision in what is now 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
See Statement of Policy Regarding Federal Common Law and Statutory Provisions
Protecting FDIC, as Receiver or Corporate Liquidator, Against Unrecorded
Agreements or Arrangements of a Depository Institution Prior to Receivership, 62
Fed. Reg. 5984 (1997) [hereinafter Statement of Policy]. While D'Oench, Duhme is a
rule of estoppel, § 1823(e) is a statute of frauds. See Galves, Special Powers, supra
note 85, at 473. Satisfying § 1823(e)'s recording requirements allows borrowers to
assert the validity of any side-agreements made with banks in the event of a bank
failure. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) states:
Agreements against interests of Corporation.
(1) In general. No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the
interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it tinder this or 11
[12 USCS § 18211, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as
receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the
Corporation unless such agreement-
(A) is in writing,
(B) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming
an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor,
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository
institution,
(C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository
institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in
the minutes of said board or committee, and
2000]
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counterparts to the FDIC in all of its regulatory capacities and to
transferee banks ° Courts have upheld the exercise of FDIC common
law powers by private parties to ensure that the FDIC can market the
assets of a failed depository institution.91 Because there are no hidden
defenses derived from unrecorded side agreements when D'Oench,
Duhme is asserted, these assets are neither risky nor undesirable
purchases.92 Courts also believed that because purchasers also need to
value the assets of the failed financial institutions accurately, third
parties should possess the same common law protections as the
FDIC.93 FDIC bank examiners and private entities that purchase
assets from the FDIC equally rely on the accuracy of the records of
depository institutions.94  These courts believed that financial
institutions would not enter into P&As without D'Oench, Duhme
protection. 95
As another matter, the majority courts found no legitimate reason
to let debtors resurrect defenses abrogated by D'Oench, Duhme once
the FDIC has transferred the note to a third party.96 Because the
(D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official
record of the depository institution.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1994).
89. See supra note 66.
90. See Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1990)
(extending federal holder in due course status to transferees); Bell & Murphy &
Assocs. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1990)
(extending status to bridge banks); Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass'n., 903 F.2d 379, 380
(5th Cir. 1990) (extending D'Oench, Duhme to Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation assignee); FSLIC v. Consolidated Fed. Say. Bank, 918 F.2d 557, 560 (5th
Cir. 1990) (same); FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1989) (extending federal
holder in due course status to private party relying on D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) and Gunter v. Hutcheson); cf Garrett v. Coastal Fin. Management
Co., 765 F. Supp. 351, 352-53 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (making D'Oench, Duhme and §
1823(e) defenses available to subsidiaries of failed financial institutions).
91. See Newhart, 892 F.2d at 50.
92. See Galves, Special Powers, supra note 85, at 478 (speculating about the
FDIC's difficulty in finding third parties willing to purchase risky assets); Michael W.
Lillie, Federal Superpowers in Failed Banking Litigation: The D'Oench, Duhme
Doctrine, 20 Colo. Law. 427,432 (1991).
93. See Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6, at 1382-83.
94. See id. at 1362-63.
95. Cf. Newhart, 892 F.2d at 50 (discussing extension of FDIC's common law
HDC status). The Newhart court argues:
[A] contrary result would emasculate the policy behind § 1823(e) of
promoting purchase and assumption transactions. If holder in due course
status did not run with the notes acquired by the FDIC in purchase and
assumption transactions, the market for such notes would be smaller, which
would have a deleterious effect on the FDIC's ability to protect the assets of
failed banks.
Id.
96. See Willow Tree Inv. v. Wagner, 453 N.W. 2d 641, 644 (Iowa 1990) ("It would
be contrary to these stated goals to allow a party to revive claims against the insolvent
institution simply because the FDIC subsequently transferred the note to a third
party.").
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transfer of such obligations is a common practice, the fact that the
transferee is a holder in due course is neither inequitable nor an unfair
surprise to the maker of the note.97 Lastly, the enormous cost of the
bailout of the failed S&Ls in the 1980s gave courts another practical
reason to extend these superpowers to third parties.9s Without the
sale of these assets, the FDIC and RTC would have faced the
insurmountable task of litigating all the claims on the billions of
dollars of assets it held.99
The next part will examine federal court jurisdiction and will
describe the Congressional grant of the FDIC's federal jurisdiction in
title 12 § 1819(b)(2)(A).
II. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
This part explores the foundations of the subject matter jurisdiction
of federal courts. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's ability
to hear and decide "cases of the general cases or category," with
respect to the particular proceeding before it."00 After setting out a
constitutional and statutory analysis of federal jurisdiction, this part
will explore the FDIC's statutory grant of jurisdiction under
FIRREA.
A. Constitutional Power and Jurisdictional Limits
Article III of the Constitution states that "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority."10' Chief Justice John
Marshall broadly interpreted this grant of judicial power in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States,"~ where he stated, "[o]riginal jurisdiction,
so far as the constitution gives a rule, is co-extensive with the judicial
power."'0" In Osborn, Marshall announced that federal jurisdiction
97. See Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1250 (5th Cir. 1990). In
Campell Leasing, the court wrote:
A negotiable instrument is subject to transfer at any time and the maker
must always be aware that the transferee may be a holder in due course.
From the maker's view, there is no difference between his bank failing and
the note going to the... FDIC, and his bank failing after selling the note to
a holder in due course.
lId
98. See Bock, supra note 60, at 958 ("With the acceleration of bank and thrift
failures in the early 1980s, however, Congress began to embark on enlarging the
D'Oench doctrine to further protect the FDIC's interest in safeguarding the insurance
fund.").
99. See Zisman & Woung, supra, note 61, at 516.
100. Black's Law Dictionary 854 (6th ed. 1990).
101. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
102. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
103. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 821.
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exists where federal law forms "an ingredient of the original cause. ' ' "N
The Constitutional grant is broad, but the actual exercise of federal
court power to hear a case depends on statutory law.105  The
Constitution empowers Congress to control the scope of lower court
jurisdiction.0 6 Congress has never extended federal jurisdiction to the
full limits articulated in Osborn.'0 The federal question s08 and
diversity statutes'09 are the two primary grants conferring original
jurisdiction to the federal courts. The general federal question statute
closely tracks the language of Article III, giving a court subject matter
jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States."110 Diversity jurisdiction refers to the
jurisdiction of federal courts over citizens of different states."' Under
§ 1332, the requisite amount in controversy must also be met. 12
Jurisdiction in the lower federal courts is further limited by the
amount-in-controversy requirement' and the narrow interpretation
of the scope of the Congressional grant in the federal question
statute.1
4
B. Policy Reasons for Jurisdictional Limits
As a general matter, federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction."5 In contrast, most state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction and may hear matters that include all causes of action
unless barred by statute." 6  State courts also enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts over all matters, with the exception of
actions arising from specific federal statutes that establish exclusive
104. Id. at 823.
105. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989).
106. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress shall have Power...[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.").
107. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve & Peter Raven-Hansen, Understanding Civil
Procedure 103 (1996) ("Congress has never vested [lower federal courts] with as
much subject matter jurisdiction as Article III permits."); Charles Alan Wright, Law
of Federal Courts § 10 at 40-47 (1994) (discussing Congressional discretion to confer
jurisdiction on lower federal courts).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). This version of the general federal question
statute was enacted in 1976. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Weschler's The
Federal Courts and The Federal System 883 (4th ed. 1996).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
110. Id. § 1331. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. §
1331; see Shreve & Raven-Hansen, supra note 107, at 105.
111. See Black's Law Dictionary 477 (6th ed. 1990).
112. See id.
113. See Shreve & Raven-Hansen, supra note 107, at 104. The amount in
controversy is the amount of alleged damages claimed or relief demanded by the
plaintiff. See Black's Law Dictionary 83 (6th ed. 1990).
114. See Erwin Chermerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.2, at 264 (3d ed. 1999); supra
note 107 and accompanying text.
115. See Chermerinsky, supra note 114, § 5.1 at 257.
116. See id.
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federal jurisdiction."7  Federal courts exist so that the federal
government can protect federal rights and enforce its own laws.""
Federalism concerns underlie the limited scope of the jurisdictional
grant conferred to federal district courts. The federal forum created
by these statutes exists as a prophylactic against perceived dangers
that may arise if state courts hear cases in diversity or those that arise
under federal law." 9 Underlying this justification is the view that state
courts are less desirable forums in which to achieve federal aims.'21
This distrust of state courts is comprised of several elements. State
courts may lack the expertise to interpret and apply federal law."' A
state court's parochial interest may influence actions involving parties
who are citizens of different states"' or the federal government.,'
Some commentators also believe that uniformity of federal law is
better achieved through a federal district court system.124
C. Discretionary Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction
Economy and efficiency, along with convenience and fairness to
litigants, are administrative and equitable elements that also shape the
exercise of federal jurisdiction." Courts must consider these aspects
when parties wish to bring additional claims or parties to an action."21
117. See id.
11& See Shreve & Raven-Hansen, supra note 107, at 104 (describing federal
jurisdiction as "premised on the belief that federal courts should have the authority to
expound and apply federal law because of their expertise in that law, their relative
insulation from local majoritarian pressures (and correspondingly more protective
attitude toward federal rights), and their ability to give federal law more uniform
application than state courts").
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Chermerinsky, supra note 114, § 5.2.1 at 263.
122. See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 87 (1809);
Chemerinsky, supra note 114, § 5.3 at 289.
123. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 849 (1824)
("[I]f the Courts of the United States cannot rightfully protect the agents who execute
every law authorized by the constitution, from the direct action of State agents in the
collection of penalties, they cannot rightfully protect those who execute any law.").
124. See Shreve & Raven-Hansen, supra note 107, at 104.
125. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,724-26 (1966).
126. The exercise of a court's jurisdiction over these additional parties and claims is
codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
These concerns of economy, fairness, and efficiency also affect a district court's
exercise of discretion to decline cases properly within the jurisdiction of federal
courts. See Wright, supra note 107, § 52, at 323. When there are related or even
parallel proceedings in federal and state courts, sometimes a party urges a federal
court to decline to proceed. The abstention doctrine is based in case law and there
are exceptional instances where federal courts decline to exercise their jurisdiction.
See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818-20
(1976) (enforcing a stay when parallel proceedings occur in federal court only in
"exceptional" circumstances); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (concerning
state criminal proceedings); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943)
(declining to interfere in state administrative proceedings); Railroad Comm'n of
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This section focuses on the supplemental jurisdiction statute as an
example of the discretionary exercise of federal court jurisdiction.
1. Constitutional Background
Finley v. United States127 and United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs"8 are two important cases that shaped the supplemental
jurisdiction statute and laid the foundations for the contemporary
debate on the scope of modem federal court jurisdiction.
Gibbs first addressed the Constitutional "power"12 9 of a federal
court to hear pendent claims, in other words, "nonfederal claims
between parties litigating other matters properly before the court.""13
The Court noted that Article III's jurisdictional grant extended to
state claims related to a federal claim with "substance sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. 13 1  Together, the
federal and related state claims comprise "one constitutional 'case. '132
Gibbs described related claims as claims that "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. '133
Gibbs relied on the view of federal court practice espoused by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It characterized the tenor of the
Federal Rules as "entertaining the broadest possible scope of action
consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and
remedies is strongly encouraged. '' 1 4 After discussing the authority of
the court to hear non-federal claims that are deemed part of the same
constitutional case, Gibbs then announced that the exercise of such
jurisdiction is discretionary and guided by considerations of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.' 1 35  According to
Gibbs, federal courts are also to avoid issuing needless decisions of
state law in the interests of comity1 36
The Supreme Court's decision in Finley placed in doubt much of the
case law following the approach to pendent jurisdiction outlined in
Gibbs. Finley cautioned courts against the exercise of jurisdiction
absent affirmative Congressional authorization. 37 The Finley decision
questioned the ability of a plaintiff to add pendent parties, parties
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (deferring to state court in order to
allow state to interpret a state statute subject to Constitutional challenge).
127. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
128. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
129. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
130. Finley, 490 U.S. at 548.
131. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 724.
135. Id. at 726.
136. See id.
137. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
[Vol. 69
RIGHTS OF ASSET PURCHASERS
"over whom no independent basis of jurisdiction exists,"'' 3 to an
action based on exclusive federal court jurisdiction under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.139 Justice Scalia wrote on behalf of the Court, and
cast doubt upon the constitutionality of this exercise of jurisdiction."0
He claimed that Congressional authority to exercise pendent party
jurisdiction was absent.14' In defense of this result, he urged a more
clear indication from Congress: "[w]hat is of paramount importance is
that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of language it
adopts."'14 2 The decision prompted the enactment of such a provision
in 1990.
2. Enactment of § 1367
The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,'* allows
claims without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction to
accompany a jurisdictionally sufficient claim into federal court when
they are part of one "constitutional case.""' Supplemental
jurisdiction does not extend to all related claims that originate from
the same nucleus of operative fact. For example, § 1367(b) demes
federal supplemental jurisdiction when a case is in federal court
because of diversity of citizenship if the additional parties to be added
would not meet the requirements of § 1332.45
Section 1367(c) lists four factors that guide the discretionary
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.1 6 The first two factors address
issues of federal courts interpreting state law. A court can elect not to
exercise jurisdiction where novel or complex state law issues exist in
related claims or when state law claims predominate over those claims
that have original jurisdiction. 47 Under the third factor, when "the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
13& Id at 551.
139. See id. at 546-47.
140. See id. at 549.
141. See id
142 Id. at 556.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in subs (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
144. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,725 (1966).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
146. See id. § 1367(c)(1)-(4).
147. See id.
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jurisdiction," a court may decline jurisdiction in its discretion.'48
Finally, under § 1367(c)(4), discretion may be exercised when
"exceptional circumstances" or "other compelling reasons" are
present. 49
There is conflict among the circuits 150 as to whether § 1367(c) leaves
intact the scope of a court's discretion as articulated in Gibbs5' and
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill152 Although legislative history
indicates that § 1367 aimed to codify and restore pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction to its pre-Finley status, 53 the statute does not
adopt the discretionary analysis of Gibbs.'5 Some commentators
have argued that § 1367 broadens a federal court's ability to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction because § 1367(c)(1)-(4) limits discretion to
decline jurisdiction.155
The Supreme Court discussed its understanding of the legislative
intent of § 1367(c) in its City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons5 6 decision. Its interpretation supports the theory that
Congress codified Gibbs in § 1367(c). 157 In International College of
Surgeons, the Court incorporated Gibbs and Cohill when it discussed
the policies guiding the proper exercise of discretion under § 1367.158
The discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal
court to "consider and weigh in each case, at every stage of litigation,
148. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
149. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
150. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal
Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 855, 943 (1998) (describing the
division between the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit approaches). Oakley writes,
"[t]here are manifest discrepancies between Gibbs' standards and the text of
subsection 1367(c)." Id.
151. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (listing
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants").
152. 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (listing values such as "economy, convenience,
fairness and comity").
153. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
154. See Jon D. Corey, Comment, The Discretionary Exercise of Supplemental
Jurisdiction Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1263,
1272-82, 1288-95 (1995).
155. See id. at 1282-87. Other commentators attribute the conflict to the Practice
Commentary of Professor David Siegel, who identifies the abstention doctrine as the
source of the discretionary factors in the subsection of § 1367(c). See Joseph N.
Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow Directions: When District Courts
Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S. C. § 1367(c), 31
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 995, 1007 (1998). They believe that Siegel incorrectly describes the
legislative history of § 1367(c) by failing to emphasize Gibbs as source of the policy
and the language of the § 1367(c) subsections. See id. at 1032 ("Though the Gibbs
decision antedates the enactment of § 1367, it discussed the policies underlying the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, and its language later provided the very foundation
on which Congress built our supplemental jurisdiction statute.").
156. 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997).
157. See id.; see James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The
Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 122 n.47 (1999).
158. See International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 164-65.
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the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity.' '159
The Court mentioned that the supplemental jurisdiction statute
codified those principles."W
D. Determining Jurisdiction- Time of Filing Rule
The time-of-filing rule takes a snapshot of events at the time a
complaint is filed in federal court to determine whether proper federal
jurisdiction exists. In cases of removal from state court, the district
court analyzes whether it has subject matter jurisdiction as of the time
of the filing of the removal motion. 61 After a court finds that it has
proper authority to hear a case, subsequent events cannot divest the
court of jurisdiction. These events may include destruction of
complete diversity following a change in domicile or the parties, or an
amendment or dismissal of a claim that reduces the amount in
controversy below the statutory threshold."6
The time-of-filing rule prevents strategic behavior by parties to
defeat federal jurisdiction once litigation has begun."t ' For example,
an amended pleading that lowers the amount in controversy below the
statutory requirement does not divest the federal court of authority to
hear that case.164 A plaintiff's efforts to remand an action to state
court by amending the pleading to lower the jurisdictional amount
would fail. The time-of-filing rule also minimizes disruptions from
repeated challenges to the court's subject matter jurisdiction and lends
159. Id at 173 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 357
(1988)).
160. See id Finally, the Court treated abstention as a separate and additional
justification for a federal court to decline or stay the exercise of jurisdiction over state
law claims, and therefore made it less likely that abstention was the doctrinal source
for the § 1367(c) factors. See id. at 174. The court noted that abstention may be
proper in situations "even if the jurisdictional prerequisites are otherwise satisfied."
Id.
161. See Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Shierk, 121 F.3d 1114,1117 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A
defect in diversity jurisdiction exists, if at all, only when a case is filed in federal court
or removed to federal court from state court."). In cases where federal question
jurisdiction is alleged, the defendant must show that, in accord with the well-pleaded
complaint rule, a federal question is an essential ingredient of the complaint. See
Franchise Tax Board v. Const. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10
(1983).
162. See e.g., Bermudez v. Industrial Siderurgica, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 57,59 (D.P.Rt
1987) ("It is well established that a federal court does not lose diversity jurisdiction
which was founded at the commencement of the action although domiciliary of one of
the parties has changed, substitution by a non-diverse person, or the amount
recovered fell below the $10,000." (citation omitted)).
163. See New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101
F.3d 1492, 1503 (3d Cir. 1996).
164. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,289-90 (1938).
Likewise, if a judgment awarded turns out to be less than the amount in controversy,
a court still retains diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy was pled
in good faith at the time of filing. See Grinnell, 121 F.3d at 1116.
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stability and certainty to litigation.165 The rule prevents undue delay
in litigation and unnecessary appeals.1" The Supreme Court also
noted that extra-judicial concerns require the rule because "[a]
contrary rule could well have the effect of deterring normal business
transactions during the pendency of what might be lengthy
litigation." 167
There are no references to the time-of-filing rule in any
jurisdictional statute.16 However, the principle has an illustrious
history and there is ample support for the rule in case law. 69
According to Chief Justice Marshall, "[i]t is quite clear, that the
jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time
of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by
subsequent events.""17 Supreme Court decisions have affirmed its
application in cases dealing with changes in the amount in
controversy171 and diversity of citizenship 72 that occur subsequent to
filing in federal court.
It is unclear, however, whether the time-of-filing rule has withstood
the rigors of a constitutional analysis. Justice Scalia challenged its
status as an "ironclad per se rule without exceptions" and questioned
whether "events at the initiation of the lawsuit are the only properjurisdictional reference point." '173  Indeed, in exceptional
circumstances, a safety valve exists and the time-of-filing rule is not
165. See Charles Alan Wright, et al., 13B Federal Practice and Procedure § 3608, at
453 (2d ed. 1984).
166. See Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Were it necessary to
track changes of citizenship throughout litigation, courts would face potentially
difficult burdens of either holding cases in abeyance for the diversity requirements to
be satisfied or, alternatively, repeatedly adjudicating challenges to previous
determinations that diversity jurisdiction existed.").
167. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426,428-29 (1991) (per
curiam).
168. See Wright et al., supra note 165, § 3608 at 452.
169. See, e.g., Freeport, 498 U.S. at 428 ("We have consistently held that if
jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be
divested by subsequent events."); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 569-70 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun J., dissenting) (affirming the "longstanding rule that
jurisdiction is to be assessed under the facts existing when the complaint is filed");
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989) ("The existence of
federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is
filed."); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957) ("The rationale, that jurisdiction
is tested by the facts as they existed when the action is brought, is applied to a
situation where a party dies and a nondiverse representative is substituted."); St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 289-90 ("Events occurring subsequent to the
institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do
not oust jurisdiction."); Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 57 (holding that a party that became a
United States citizen by the time of trial and possibly changed domicile could not cure
the jurisdictional defect at outset of case).
170. Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824).
171. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 289.
172 See Mullen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 539.
173. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 598-99 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mechanically applied. In two cases, for example, although no federal
court jurisdiction appeared at the outset of the trial, the Supreme
Court refused to dismiss or remand cases when federal jurisdiction
later vested or was repaired. First, in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-
Larrain,'7 the Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the appellate court to dismiss a party that spoiled
complete diversity. 5 At oral argument on his own motion, Judge
Easterbrook of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
questioned the presence of diversity jurisdiction.'76 One of the
respondents was a United States citizen who was stateless for the
purposes of the diversity statute because he was domiciled in
Venezuela." 7 Instead of dismissing the case for a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, or remanding the case to the district court, the
Court of Appeals granted petitioner Newman-Green's motion to
amend the complaint to drop the non-diverse respondent.17 The
Supreme Court concluded that the dismissal did not prejudice any of
the parties and that the non-diverse party was dispensable."7 They
noted that "[n]othing but a waste of time and resources would be
engendered by remanding to the District Court or by forcing these
parties to begin anew."'" In Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 181 the parties
were not in complete diversity when the claim was removed to federal
court over the objection of the plaintiff." By the time the case
reached litigation, a settlement had induced the non-diverse party to
withdraw."s The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court
judgment because it found that diversity was not complete when
Caterpillar removed the case to federal court."" Efficiency concerns,
particularly the cost to both the federal and state courts of retrying a
case where final judgment was entered, were key to the Court's
decision to reverse the appellate court and uphold the judgment of the
district court.'81 The Supreme Court has disregarded the time-of-filing
rule, where in the interests of finality and efficiency, its application
would waste the time and resources of the courts and the parties.
174. 490 U.S. 826 (1989).
175. See id at 833 (allowing Court of Appeals to dismiss a dispensable non-diverse
party under Rule 21 in order to retroactively confer jurisdiction).
176. See id at 828.
177. See id.
17& See id. at 829.
179. See id
180. Id. at 838.
181. 519 U.S. 61 (1996).
182- See id at 64.
183. See id
184. See id at 67.
185. See id at 77 ("To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state
court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements, would impose an
exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and
unprotracted administration of justice.").
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E. Basis for FDIC Jurisdiction
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A), "all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity," in which the FDIC appears in any capacity,
"arise under the laws of the United States.' 18 6 All actions in which the
FDIC is a party, whether as a plaintiff or defendant, fall under federal
question jurisdiction. The statute lists one exception to this broad
grant of federal jurisdiction.' Congress withheld jurisdiction when
the FDIC acts as a receiver of a state-insured depository institution,
and it is not a plaintiff in an action brought under state law that
"involves only the preclosing rights against the State insured
depository institution" or obligations of the institution to its
depositors, creditors or stockholders.' s  In addition, after the
enactment of FIRREA, the FDIC gained agency status. 8 9 Under 28
U.S.C. § 1345, Congress conferred original jurisdiction on district
courts in "civil actions, suits or proceedings" brought by agencies of
the United States recognized under the statute. 9°
Before FIRREA, statutory language did not recognize the FDIC as
an agency of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. Section
1819(b)(1) was originally enacted as part of the FDIC's enabling
legislation in 12 U.S.C. § 264(j) of the Banking Act of 1933.' 9' The
earliest version of the statute granting jurisdiction, former § 264(j),
contained a provision authorizing the FDIC to "sue and be sued" in
any federal or state court.19 The Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the Congressional grant of original jurisdiction in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,"9 and again in American National
Red Cross v. S.G.'94 Both D'Oench, Duhme and Red Cross affirmed
that the "sue or be sued ... in any court of law or equity, State or
Federal" language in a federal charter was a sufficient ground on
which to rest federal jurisdiction.95 The majority opinion in Red
Cross traced its reasoning to Osborn v. Bank of United States, where
Justice Marshall found federal jurisdiction based on the bank's sue
and be sued chartering language. 96  The propriety of the
Congressional grant of FDIC jurisdiction under FIRREA therefore
rests on a sound constitutional basis.
Section 1819(b)(2)(A) is a broad Congressional grant of federal
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) (1994).
187. See id. § 1819(b)(2)(D).
188. Id.
189. See id. § 1819(b)(1).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994).
191. See American Nat. Red Cross, v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247,254 n.4. (1992).
192. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co., v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,455 (1942).
193. Id. at 456.
194. 505 U.S. 247 (1992).
195. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 455; Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 254-55.
196. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 817 (1824).
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jurisdiction.197 Under § 1819, the FDIC can commence litigation in
federal court or remove an action to federal court in any capacity,
whether it is "stepping into the shoes" of a failed depository
institution as a receiver or acting in its corporate capacity to recover
assets for the deposit insurance fund.'1s In contrast to this clear
Congressional grant, the status of federal jurisdiction when the FDIC
sells assets of a failed bank to a non-diverse private party is an issue
that has divided the circuit courts. The next part will describe the
legal controversy.
III. LEGAL CONTROVERSY
As part of its duties as receiver, or while acting in its capacity as an
insurer, the FDIC may pursue litigation to collect assets from debtors
that are owed to banks.199 The FDIC regularly sells these assets to
private parties as part of its strategy to recover the maximum value of
these assets and minimize loss to the insurance fund. -  A legal
controversy arises when the FDIC transfers assets of a failed
depository institution to a private party during pending litigation in
federal court, leaving non-diverse remaining parties who assert only
state law claims. Authorities disagree as to whether FIRREA allows
the successor party to avoid remand to state court. This part discusses
two approaches taken by federal courts to address this jurisdictional
question.
A. The Majority
Courts in the majority have applied case law that extends FDIC
common law and statutory powers under FIRREA to third party
purchasers, holding that federal jurisdiction passes with assignment of
the assets. The majority courts viewed private party purchasers as
successors in interest to the FDIC. These courts have also invoked
the time-of-filing rule to hold that once jurisdiction has been properly
established, it does not disappear after a transfer in interest.
1. Private Parties Inherit FDIC Superpowers
The majority courts determined that the transferees' right to assert
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine justifies the preservation of federal
jurisdiction after the FDIC is no longer a party to the case. 01 Just as
policy reasons supported the extension of D'Oench, Duhme to private
parties, "[t]he policy reasons for insuring federal jurisdiction over
197. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
19& See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) (1994).
199. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
201. SeeFSLICv. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691,696 (5th Cir. 1991).
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cases involving the actions of failed thrifts continue when the FDIC is
voluntarily dismissed as a party and the owner of the failed thrift's
assets remains. ' '202 According to several courts, the grant of federal
jurisdiction to the FDIC originated from a desire for the uniform
application of FIRREA and the unhindered exercise of the FDIC's
powers.23 Because private parties may assert the FDIC's federal
common law powers by virtue of assignment, courts still have an
interest in the uniform application of these laws.
Majority courts also found support in FIRREA's "comprehensive
scheme" for continuing federal jurisdiction in the action after the
FDIC has assigned these assets and is no longer a party. 204 FIRREA
reflects a clear "policy interest" to get the assets of failed financial
institutions out of the FDIC's hands as quickly as possible.20 5 By
disposing of these assets, the insurance fund is protected, and
taxpayers need not bear the burden of an insolvent depository
institution. Hence, the transfers of these assets to private parties are
"in the public interest."2' For that reason, courts have decided that it
would be contrary to FIRREA and against the public interest to make
these transactions more costly by shuffling litigation between state
and federal courts.2 °7
2. The Time-of-Filing Rule
Courts in the majority have also held that jurisdiction is determined
either at the time a claim is filed in federal court or at the time of its
removal, and any events after the time of filing do not divest subject
matter jurisdiction.2°8 According to the courts, remand to state court
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Mizuna, Ltd. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank, 90 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir.
1996) (discussing FIRREA's "sweeping powers"). But see CIT, Inc. v. Willow St.
Assocs., No. 93 Civ. 1201, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12844, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
1997) (noting that state courts are "up to [the] task" of interpreting common law
D'Oench, Duhme).
204. Mizuna, 90 F.3d at 657.
205. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir. 1993).
206. FDIC v. Four Star Holding Co., 178 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1999).
207. See CIT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12844, at *24. ("[T]he FDIC would be given
the tools to come into federal court, and then, if it is able to serve its function by
divesting itself of the assets at issue, the efforts expended by the litigants and federal
judges could be wasted, as the litigation might well need to proceed again from
scratch in state court."); cf Harding v. Bell, 817 F. Supp. 1186, 1195 (D.N.J. 1993)
(discussing why federal jurisdiction attaches in pre-receivership claims). Harding
dealt with establishing jurisdiction in an action in federal court before the FDIC was
appointed receiver. See Harding, 817 F. Supp. at 1188. In addition to relying on the
time-of-filing rule, the court acknowledged that the Congressional intent behind the
statutory scheme of FIRREA was to facilitate the smooth and efficient takeover and
rehabilitation of failed depository institutions. See id. at 1195-96. When claims that
may be "substantially underway" are dismissed only to return after the claims
procedure is exhausted, such an efficient scheme is frustrated. Id.
208. See Four Star, 178 F.3d at 100-01; FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 696 (5th Cir.
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would increase litigation costs and expend the court's resources. :w
Likewise, if jurisdiction were reassessed after a new party joined the
action, there would be a disincentive for "normal business
transactions" to take place during often lengthy litigation."' 0
Therefore, under the time-of-filing rule, the transfer of assets from the
FDIC to a private party does not divest a court's subject matter
jurisdiction over the action, despite the fact that the remaining parties
are non-divdrse and the action only concerns state law claims.
B. The Minority
Two cases provide an alternative analysis to the question of
whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction after the FDIC
transfers its assets to a private party during an ongoing litigation,
leaving non-diverse parties who assert state law claims. In 1996, the
Third Circuit adopted a contrary approach to the one employed by
the only other court of appeals that had considered this question.211
The court in New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred Entity
Advancements, Inc.212 followed the reasoning of a Maine district
court's decision in Mill Investments, Inc. v. Brooks Woolen Co.,13 and
by doing so, created a conflict of authority in the federal courts.
1. The Plain Language of FIRREA Transfers No Jurisdiction to
Assignees
Courts in the minority applied canons of statutory interpretation to
analyze FIRREA and concluded that no subject matter jurisdiction
existed in the action after the FDIC or RTC withdrew from the case.
The New Rock court mapped out its "plain meaning" analysis of
FIRREA, and considered the language of the statute, its legislative
history, and the "atmosphere in which [it] was enacted. 2 14 The Mill
court reasoned that the failure of the statute to mention assignees was
significant and Congress clearly intended that only the FDIC should
benefit from federal jurisdiction.2 15  FIRREA lacked equivalent
language indicating such intent for its assignees.216
1991).
209. See CIT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12844, at *23 ("[Tlhe parties need not litigate
an entire controversy, only to discover after much time and expense that the basis for
federal jurisdiction has eroded, and they must refight their battles in state court.").
210. Id. (citing Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428
(1991)).
211. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed Griffin in Four Star, 178
F.3d at 100.
212. 101 F.3d 1492 (3d Cir. 1996).
213. 797 F. Supp. 49 (D. Me. 1992).
214. New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1498.
215. See Mill, 797 F. Supp. at 54.
216. See id. ("Although Congress might have given removal power to assignees or
transferees from the FDIC to assure federal court application of D'Oench, Duhme, it
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The New Rock court found little guidance in the jurisdictional
language of FIRREA to decide whether assignees could remain in
federal court.217 The Third Circuit consulted the legislative history
and noted three "obvious ways" that federal jurisdiction aided the
RTC in fulfilling its statutory purpose to administer and dispose of
thrift assets. 2 18 According to the court, the RTC enjoyed a federal
forum and a uniform body of federal law on account of its (1)
receivership functions, (2) the litigation of claims on behalf of the
thrifts it controls and (3) its enforcement authority.219 Applying that
conclusion to the case before them, the Third Circuit determined that
once the RTC succeeded in either returning a thrift to solvency or
transferring its assets to willing purchasers, "the agency's role-and
hence the logic of jurisdiction-no longer exist[ed]." 220 The court
concluded that the purpose of the statute defining the RTC's role to
manage and dispose of thrift assets supported the narrowest reading
of the statute.221 Jurisdiction existed only "where the RTC is a party
but not where it was a party."I
The New Rock court commented that its reading was "consistent
with general policies underlying federal jurisdiction... [,] the limited
nature of federal jurisdiction and the goal of not interfering in the
business of the states. ' 223 The New Rock court concluded that no
independent basis for federal court jurisdiction existed. 4 Once the
FDIC was no longer a party to the action, the once jurisdictionally
sufficient case no longer involved a federal question, and thus became
merely a suit between non-diverse parties based in state law.'
2. The Minority Rejection of the Time-of-Filing Rule
Instead of applying the time-of-filing rule, the New Rock majority
applied 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute. 26
According to the court in New Rock, the time-of-filing rule applied
primarily to cases removed to federal courts based on diversity of
citizenship, and it functioned to prevent "manipulative behavior" in
federal courts, such as amending pleadings to lower the amount in
did not.").
217. See New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1498.
218. Id. at 1500.
219. See id. at 1501.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 1499. The court further stated that "[t]he RTC will presumably only be
a party where it is engaged in active management and disposal of thrifts and thrift
assets. The RTC will no longer be a party-and jurisdiction will no longer apply-
once the RTC has managed a thrift and its assets have been disposed." Id. at 1501.
223. Id. at 1502.
224. See id. at 1501.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 1504-11.
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controversy to avoid removal or changing parties to destroy
diversity. 227  The court disapproved of the time-of-filing rule's
"axiomatic" application in federal question cases.' Furthermore,
according to the court, the FDIC's sale of the assets of the failed
depository institution to a private party is a transaction at arms-
length,19 in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.?3 The
court therefore did not apply a rule that primarily dealt with deterring
a party's tactical efforts to avoid federal jurisdiction. 31
As a result, the New Rock court rejected the time-of-filing rule and
instead applied the supplemental jurisdiction statute.3- It analogized
the situation of law (where a single claim lost its federal jurisdiction by
a substitution of parties) to § 1367(c)(3), the dismissal of the
jurisdiction-conferring claim in a multiple claim action. 3 The court
found its application of the supplemental jurisdiction statute within
the permissible limits of Article III of the Constitution.- The court
compared the constitutional propriety of the single transformed claim
to dicta in the Supreme Court case of Martinez v. Lamagno.231 There,
the Court allowed judicial review in federal court although the United
States was not a party to the litigation at the time of the appeal and
the case had no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 6 The
Court reasoned that "there was a nonfrivolous federal question,
certified by the local United States Attorney, when the case was
removed to federal court. At that time, the United States was the
defendant, and the action was thus under [federal court
jurisdiction]."37
To justify invoking supplemental jurisdiction in the situation before
it, although there were no multiple claims or multiple parties as
defined under § 1367, the New Rock court argued that Congress
intended to confer federal jurisdiction to its constitutional limits.3s
The court noted that the language of the statute mirrored Article III's
reference to a "case or controversy." 39 The court claimed that §
1367's legislative history contained evidence that Congress sought to
227. Id at 1503 ("From the outset, the underlying concern of the time of filing rule
was the risk that parties would deploy procedural tactics to manipulate federaljurisdiction.").
228. Id.
229. See id. at 1504.
230. See Black's Law Dictionary 109 (6th ed. 1990) (defining arms length
transaction).
231. See New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1504.
232. See id. at 1505.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. 515 U.S. 417,435 (1995).
236. See iL
237. Id
23& See New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1509.
239. See id.; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (describing scope of judicial power).
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restore ancillary and pendent jurisdiction to its status before the
Supreme Court decision in Finley v. United States,24 to reflect the
approach of United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs.24 The court
expressed its belief that under Gibbs, supplemental jurisdiction
extended to the constitutional limit, absent any action by Congress to
restrict its exercise.242 As such, the New Rock court rejected the time-
of-filing rule and applied the supplemental jurisdiction statute.243
Instead of remanding the case to the district court to apply § 1367, the
court affirmed the lower court's jurisdiction and its order for summary
judgment.24
The next part further examines the issue of whether federal
jurisdiction exists after the FDIC transfers its assets to a third party
and exits federal court litigation, leaving non-diverse parties who
assert only state law claims. The next part explores additional case
law dealing with the law of assignments, the time-of-filing rule and
supplemental jurisdiction.
IV. ANALYSIS
This part examines the theories of the majority and minority courts
discussed in Part III in greater depth to resolve whether private
parties that purchase assets from the FDIC during pending federal
court litigation may continue there after the FDIC is no longer a party
to the case and only state law claims are at issue between non-diverse
parties. It scrutinizes related case law dealing with assignment, the
time-of-filing rule and the supplemental jurisdiction statute in order to
determine the merits of adopting each individual approach.
First, this part analyzes the theory of assignment as it has been
discussed in case law dealing specifically with the FDIC. The cases
look to the common law of assignment and include jurisdiction as a
"stick" in the bundle of rights purchased by assignees. Other cases
refine this view and hold that jurisdiction is based on the FDIC's
federal party status and therefore is non-transferable.245 As a
potential answer to these concerns about federal party status, a third
approach to assignment is discussed. This approach relies upon the
Supreme Court decision in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States,246 where the Court used the theory of partial assignment
240. 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989); see supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
241. 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1509.
242. See New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1509. The court described the "pre-Finley"
understanding of the scope of supplemental jurisdiction as "where Congress has not
spoken to the contrary or where we cannot find Congressional intent to the contrary,
jurisdictional statutes give federal courts the power to exercise ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction to the constitutional limit." Id. (quotations omitted).
243. See id. at 1511.
244. See id. at 1511-12.
245. See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
246. 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
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to allow relators to bring a qui tam action on behalf of the United
States.247
This part next assesses the time-of-filing rule as a mechanism to
preclude later challenges to jurisdiction based on subsequent changes
in parties or events. Last, the part discusses whether the supplemental
jurisdiction statute allows private parties that purchase assets from the
FDIC to litigate in federal court when the FDIC is no longer a party.
A. Assignment
Courts espousing the majority position have used the assignment
rationale to allow a wholesale transfer of federal jurisdiction from the
FDIC to a private party.2 8 Courts first applied the assignment
analysis to extend the common law D'Oench, Duhme powers to
transferees,24 9 and then used it to allow private parties to avail
themselves of the FIRREA six-year statute of limitations2 0
1. Assigning Federal Common Law Rights and Statutory Rights
under FIRREA
Although assignment has been widely applied to allow private party
purchasers to exercise D'Oench, Duhme common law powers, some
courts have not shown the same willingness to extend to assignees the
FDIC's procedural advantages, such as its statute of limitations. Case
law dealing with the assignment of the FDIC's statute of limitations is
more analogous to the issue of the FDIC's federal jurisdiction than
D'Oench, Duhme since the statute of limitations and jurisdiction are
both procedural and statutory features of the FDIC.
Under FIRREA, the statute of limitations on any action brought by
the FDIC as conservator or receiver is the longer of either the six-year
period beginning on the date the claim accrues, or the period
applicable under state law. 51 The statute of limitations starts to run
247. See id. at 1863.
248. See, eg., FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 696 (5th Cir. 1991) (-A transferee
from the FSLIC, or FDIC, as successor of their interests, is still entitled to the
protection of federal courts applying D'Oench, Didne .....
249. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
250. See infra notes 251-73 and accompanying text.
251. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) states in pertinent part:
(14) Statute of limitations for actions brought by conservator or receiver
(A) In general. Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the
applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by
the Corporation as conservator or receiver shall be
(i)in the case of any contract claim, the longer of
(I)the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues;
or
(II) the period applicable under State law....
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (1994).
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on the date the FDIC is appointed as conservator or receiver, or the
date on which the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. 2
A majority of federal and state courts have permitted assignment of
the benefits of the FIRREA's six-year statute of limitations period to
the FDIC's and RTC's assignees by relying on the same reasoning
they used to extend common law D'Oench, Duhme powers to private
entities." To decide whether assignees could exercise the federal
statute of limitations, courts looked either to federal common law or
to state law to construe what rights pass through assignment from the
FDIC to the private entity 5 4 The Fifth Circuit in FDIC v. Bledsoe 5
relied on federal common lawY6 The court looked to principles of
common law and D'Oench, Duhme and declared that "[a]n assignee
stands in the shoes of his assignor.' 257
In addition, the statute of limitations, like common law D'Oench,
Duhme powers, advanced the FDIC's goals of managing the assets of
failed banks and protecting insured depositors while minimizing the
cost to the insurance fund."8 The court feared that the market for
assets of failed banks would evaporate if the third party purchaser
could not assert the FDIC's statute of limitations. 9 The FDIC would
252. See Brian J. Woram, FIRREA's Statutes of Limitations: Their Availability to
Purchasers from the FDIC, 110 Banking L.J. 292,294 (1993).
253. See UMLIC-Nine Corp. v. Lipan Springs Dev. Corp., 168 F.3d 1173, 1177 n.3
(10th Cir. 1999) (extending statute of limitations to assignees); Cadle Co. v. 1007 Joint
Venture, 82 F.3d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying FIRREA statute of limitations to
notes in default before they were acquired by the FDIC or while owned by the
FDIC); United States v. Thornburg, 82 F.3d 886, 889-92 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying
common law of assignments); FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir. 1993)
(relying on common law and D'Oench, Duhme); see also Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v.
Tallman, 870 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo. 1994) (extending FIRREA statute of limitations
to private assignees); Cadle Co. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718, 724 (Kan. 1993) (relying on
common law and extension of D'Oench, Duhme); Central States Resources v. First
Nat'l Bank, 501 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Neb. 1993) (reasoning that assignee who stands in
shoes of FDIC "obtains the right, title, and interest that the assignor had at the time
of assignment"); SMS Fin. v. Ragland, 918 P.2d 400,403 (Okla. 1995) (same); Jackson
v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Tex. 1994) (same). No circuit court or state supreme
court has held that the six-year statute of limitations does not apply to assignees. But
see Beckley Capital Ltd. Partnership v. Di Geronimo, 184 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating hesitance to read statute as covering assignees, but, applying state law on
alternate grounds); Federal Debt Management v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774, 778
(Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (finding statute of limitations was not a "right" inherited by
assignee).
254. See National Enters., Inc. v. Barnes, 201 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2000)
(applying South Carolina law); Federal Fin. Co. v. Hall, 108 F.3d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1997)
(applying Virginia law); Remington Invest., Inc. v. Kadenacy, 930 F. Supp. 446, 448
(D. Cal. 1996) (holding that California law allows FDIC's 6-year statute of limitations
to pass to assignees).
255. 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993).
256. See id. at 810.
257. Id. (emphasis in orginal).
258. See Woram, supra note 252, at 301.
259. See Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 811 (citing Fall v. Keasler, No. C 90 20643 SW, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18771, at *8 (Dec. 18, 1991 N.D. Cal. 1991)).
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be unable to sell notes that had expired, or would be about to expire,
under the shorter state statute of limitations.2w Asset recovery would
depend in large part on the FDIC's own litigation efforts." t Such an
outcome would stymie Congress' desire for the FDIC to "rid the
federal system of failed bank assets."'
As in Bledsoe, the court in Wamco II1, Ltd. v. First Piedmont
Mortgage Corp. relied on the common law of assignments, but
reached a contrary result. The Wamco court concluded that assignees
should not receive the benefit of the longer statute of limitations
established by § 1821(d)(14). According to the court, "unless a
contrary intention is manifest or inferable, an assignment ordinarily
carries with it all rights, remedies and benefits which are incidental to
the thing assigned, except those which are personal to the assignor and
for his benefit only."' The court concluded that because Congress
clearly made the six-year statute of limitations in FIRREA applicable
only to actions brought by the RTC in its status as receiver, the RTC's
statute of limitations was non-assignable.
Following the Supreme Court decisions in O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC' and Atherton v. FDIC"7 holding that new federal common
law should not be created where there exists a comprehensive and
detailed statutory scheme like FIRREA, lower federal courts stopped
applying federal common law when deciding whether an assignee of
the FDIC may invoke the statute of limitations applicable to the
FDIC under FIRREA.2  For example, the Fourth Circuit declined to
260. See Boteler, supra note 6, at 1170 ("If the FDIC can only transfer the rights
incidental to the notes and not extend the six year limitations period, then the FDIC
will have to pursue and litigate the recovery of all those assets and notes for which the
state statute of limitations has already run.").
261. See id
262. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 811 (quoting Fall v. Keasler, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18771, at *8.
263. 856 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Va. 1994).
264. Id at 1086 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
265. See id.
266. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
267. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
26& See infra notes 269-73 and accompanying text. In O'Mehveny & Myers, the
FDIC tried to persuade the Court to create federal common law allowing the FDIC to
avoid imputation of knowledge of a failed savings and loan directors' breach of
fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 80. The Court,
in accord with its holding in Erie, refused to create new common law because Erie
clearly held that federal common law does not exist. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64,78 (1938). In addition, the Court refused to preempt state law by reading
into the statutory provisions of FIRREA a rule allowing the FDIC to displace state
law, thus avoiding imputation of knowledge of the directors' malfeasance upon the
failed bank and its receiver, the FDIC. See O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85. The
Court reasoned that because a "comprehensive and detailed" statutory scheme
already existed, the rule of decision concerning matters that Congress did not address
would presumably be derived from state law, and not some court-created supplement
to federal regulation. Id.
In Atherton, 519 U.S. 213 (1997), the Supreme Court again refused to create federal
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extend the benefit of the longer statute of limitations to assignees,
although it acknowledged that it extended D'Oench, Duhme and §
1823(e) to assignees.269 Citing O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton as
controlling law, the Fourth Circuit stated that it lacked a compelling
reason to create a new rule of federal common law." ° The application
of state law did not conflict with a federal interest or policy, which was
a necessary element to justify the creation of federal common law.271
The Fourth Circuit concluded that no conflict existed because the
FDIC's assignees were "one step further removed from the primary
conduct of the United States than the government agency receiver
whose role the O'Melveny & Myers court found to be too attenuated"
to create federal common law.272 Consequently, the court deferred to
Congress' ability to enact legislation and elected to "remain mere
observers. ' 271 In conclusion, O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton make
it unlikely that support for the extension of jurisdiction to assignees
can be based on an extension of D'Oench and federal common law.
An alternate approach based on theories of assignment and
jurisdiction follows.
2. Refining the Assignment Analysis
Several district courts have declined to hold that the FDIC's federal
jurisdictional statute applies to a private party who has purchased
assets from the FDIC.274 In a series of cases that dealt with whether
the assignment of delinquent notes included the assignment of the
right to file suit in federal court under the FDIC's jurisdictional
statute,275 these courts have applied the common law rule that the
assignee acquires all of the rights and liabilities of the assignor. 76
common law to determine the proper legal standard of care in an action brought by
the RTC against the directors of a failed depository institution. Id. at 218. Following
its previous holdings establishing the preconditions necessary before it can exercise its
common-law-making powers, the Court first examined whether there existed any
significant conflict between a federal policy or interest and the application of state law
standards. See id. at 219. The Court found no significant conflict between a federal
policy or interest and the application of state law standards that would allow them to
create a rule of federal common law. See id.
269. See Federal Fin. Co. v. Hall, 108 F.3d 46,49 (4th Cir. 1997).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
273. Id. at 50.
274. See infra note 275.
275. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust 1995-NP3-1 v. Phoenix Bond Indem. Co.,
943 F. Supp. 962, 963 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (bringing suit under FIRREA 12 U.S.C. §
1825(b) to void tax lien due to status as assignee of the RTC); S1 IL304 Ltd. Liab. Co.
v. ANB Cust. for LG ex rel Hynes, 950 F. Supp. 242, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same); RTC
Commercial Loan Trust 1995-NP1A v. Winthrop Management, 923 F. Supp. 83, 88
(E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff claims that the right to sue under § 1821(d)(17)(A)
of FIRREA included rights assigned from RTC).
276. See, e.g., Phoenix Bond, 943 F. Supp. at 965 ("Typically an assignee acquires
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These courts relied on an exception to the general rule of assignments,
which states that rights that are personal to the assignor cannot be
assigned.' According to these courts, the FDIC's federal agency
jurisdiction is a personal right that cannot be assignedY2 These courts
are of the opinion that an assignee should not succeed to the FDIC's
subject matter jurisdiction absent a Congressional grant in §
1819(b). 279
Similarly, a Virginia district court opinion distinguished jurisdiction
from the ability to assert common law D'Oench, Duhme on the basis
of "status-versus-rights." The court argued that § 1441(a), the
RTC's equivalent jurisdictional statute, was not a right, and instead, it
merely conferred federal jurisdiction.2 ' The RTC could neither
alienate its "status" as a federal party nor could it "deputize a private
party with the full powers of RTC."
A Massachusetts district court agreed that the purchase of notes
from the FDIC did not entitle the purchaser to invoke the FDIC's
removal statute.3 According to the court, removal to federal court
was merely a "procedural dimension" of the FDIC's federal party
status.' Similarly, in an opinion from the Eastern District of
Louisiana, the court held that the purchase of a mortgage from the
RTC did not make the plaintiff an agent of the RTC for the purposes
of federal question jurisdiction.' The defendant, therefore, lacked
the ability to remove the case from Louisiana state court because the
claim did not arise under federal law and no diversity existed.38
These minority courts challenge the ability of the FDIC to assign
federal jurisdiction to private party purchasers because they classify
the FDIC's jurisdiction, based on its status as a federal party, as a
personal right that cannot be transferred under the common law of
all the assignor's rights and liabilities in the assignment.").
277. See id.; Winthrop Management, 923 F. Supp. at 88.
27& See Phoenix Bond, 943 F. Supp. at 965; Winthrop Management, 923 F. Supp. at
88.
279. See Phoenix Bond, 943 F. Supp. at 965. The Phoenix Bond Court wrote:
Extending certain defenses, and even statutory limitations periods, is
decidedly different than extending this court's original jurisdiction.
Congress explicitly stated that federal subject matter jurisdiction would exist
when the RTC is a party to the lawsuit. It could have identified RTC or its
assigns, but did not. The right to sue in federal court is a benefit that is
generally personal unless a statute dictates otherwise.
Id.
280. Winthrop Management, 923 F. Supp at 87.
281. See id. at 88.
282. Id. at 87.
283. See Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Dion, 929 F. Supp. 29,31 (D. Mass. 1996).
284. Id.
285. See Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin. Co. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., No. 96-0155, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2416 at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 27, 1996).
286. See id at *5.
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assignments.' Minority courts also have argued that jurisdiction is a
procedural feature and not a right.' A recent Supreme Court
decision may nevertheless acknowledge the ability of a federal party
to assign its status for the purposes of jurisdiction. 9
In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, the
Supreme Court adopted an assignment approach to allow private
citizens who bring qui tam actions to meet the standing threshold of
Article III of the Constitution.2' Qui tam is an abbreviation of a
Latin phrase that is translated in its entirety as, "[w]ho sues on behalf
of the King as well as for himself." '291 To establish standing and meet
the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the
Constitution, a plaintiff must show an "injury-in-fact" to a concrete
degree, establish causation between the alleged conduct of the
defendant and the injury-in-fact, and demonstrate that the relief
requested will redress the claimed injury.29 The False Claims Act
enables a person who possesses knowledge of fraud perpetrated
against the Federal Government to bring suit both on this person's
own behalf and on behalf of the United States.293 Article III requires
that the injury-in-fact be suffered by the complaining party, but when
a person sues as a qui tam relator, it is the United States who suffered
the alleged injury. 94 The Court held that private citizens who bring a
claim under the False Claims Act could satisfy the Constitutional
standing requirement because through the Act, Congress makes a
partial assignment of the government's claim. 95 The Court declared,
287. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
289. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel Stevens, 120
S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
290. See id. at 1863; see also United States ex rel Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743,
748 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the federal government's claims are assigned through
the false claims Act); United States ex rel Waris v. Staff Builders, Inc., No. 96-1969,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2998 at *10 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999) (adopting assignment
theory); United States ex rel Chandler v. Hektoen Inst. for Med. Research, 35 F.
Supp. 2d. 1078, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (same); United States ex rel Yankton Sioux Tribe
v. Gambler's Supply, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 658, 668 n.12 (D.S.D. 1996) (recognizing
assignment as possible rationale); Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui
Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 543, 565-70 (1990)
(advocating the adoption of an assignment theory to allow a qui tam plaintiff to satisfy
constitutional standing requirements).
291. Black's Law Dictionary 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
292. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 120 S. Ct. at 1861.
293. See James Y. Ho, Note, State Sovereign Immunity and The False Claims Act:
Respecting the Limitations Created by the Eleventh Amendment Upon the Federal
Courts, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 189, 189 (1999).
294. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 120 S. Ct. at 1862.
295. See id. at 1863. The assignment is partial because under the False Claims Act
the government may intervene in the action within 60 days of the relator's delivery of
the complaint, or may do so afterwards by a good cause showing. See id. at 1861. The
government keeps 70%-85% of the proceeds of the action, depending on whether or
not it has intervened. See id.
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"the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact
suffered by the assignor."2' When the government has established
the requisite injury-in-fact, causation and redressability, the relator
becomes eligible to sue in federal court by way of assignment.'
The assignment approach articulated by the Supreme Court in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources refutes the idea that federal
party status or agency status cannot be assigned. If a private party
can succeed to the federal government's injury-in-fact by way of
assignment, a party may likewise succeed to a federal agency's federal
party status for Article III purposes. But unlike the False Claims Act,
where Congress explicitly conferred upon private parties the right to
bring an action on behalf of the United States, a similar right of
private parties to bring suit under FIRREA is absent. -
The next part discusses the time-of-filing rule. The part highlights
the rule's application by courts to interpret the effect of the
administrative claims procedure under FIRREA on the jurisdiction of
federal and state courts.
B. Time of Filing
Courts when interpreting other provisions of FIRREA have applied
the time-of-filing rule. Courts have applied the time-of-filing rule and
interpreted FIRREA to uphold the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in federal and state courts against FDIC and RTC
assertions of exclusive jurisdiction in the administrative claims
process. State courts used the rule to uphold concurrent jurisdiction
over pending claims brought before the appointment of the RTC and
FDIC as receivers despite RTC and FDIC assertions that the federal
courts retain exclusive jurisdiction."' Likewise, federal courts used
296. Id. One court characterized this notion by stating, "the qui tam plaintiff
effectively stands in the shoes of the government." United States er rel Kelly v.
Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743,748 (9th Cir. 1993).
297. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 120 S. Ct. at 1863.
29& See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
300. See e.g., RTC v. Foust, 869 P.2d 183, 193 (Ariz. 1993) (rejecting exclusive
federal court jurisdiction and noting that "Congress, in enacting FIRREA, could have
overridden the time of filing rule and divested all other courts of jurisdiction");
Robbins v. Foothill Nissan, 28 Cal. 2d. 190, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting an
automatic rule to divest state court of jurisdiction after the FDIC became receiver
when claim against depository institution began in state court before appointment);
Berke v. RTC, 483 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. 1992) ("Measuring jurisdiction as of the
time of filing is consistent with traditional authorities."); RTC v. Binford, 844 P.2d
810, 816 (N.M. 1992) (holding that state court retained the subject matter jurisdiction
that vested when counterclaims were originally filed, despite subsequent RTC
appointment as receiver).
For a critical look at the RTC's attempts to establish exclusive federal subject
matter jurisdiction in claims brought against the RTC in the receivership capacity, see
generally Jeffrey S. Rosenblum, The RTC's Quest for Erclusive Federal Court
Jurisdiction Under FIRREA, 24 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 725 (1994). Rosenblum finds no
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the time-of-filing rule as a ground to keep jurisdiction over claims
brought against the depository institution before it went into
receivership. 3°1 These cases illustrate the belief held by many courts
that the application of the time-of-filing rule is consistent with
FIRREA.
The Supreme Court has declined to apply the time-of-filing rule
only in exceptional circumstances and has done so in the interest of
factors such as the finality of a judgment.3 °z It is, therefore, unlikely
that they will decline to apply the time-of-filing rule when the FDIC
sells assets to a private party and only non-diverse parties and state
law claims remain in the action, unless they do so on a case-by-case
basis in the interests of preserving a final judgment.
The legal controversy addressed here is readily distinguished from
those exceptional circumstances. In Caterpillar and Newman-Green,
jurisdiction did not exist at the outset of the case and later the defect
was cured.30 3 In both cases, the district court had already entered
judgment.3°4 By contrast, under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A), the
FDIC's presence in the lawsuit confers subject matter jurisdiction at
the outset of litigation, or whenever the FDIC joins the action.3 5
Arguably, a jurisdictional defect is only created after the FDIC has
transferred its assets to a non-diverse party.
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
As discussed in Part III, the minority courts declined to apply the
time-of-filing rule to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
explicit statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction in FIRREA. See id. at 728. His
analysis of the statutory provisions for the administrative claims procedure, judicial
review of administrative claims, 90 day stay of actions ongoing in court when the RTC
is appointed as receiver, and removal, all support concurrent jurisdiction. See id. at
728-35. Rosenblum notes, however, that in light of the liberal removal authority
granted by FIRREA, the more confounding question about exclusive jurisdiction is
"why anyone really cares." Id. at 738.
301. See, e.g., Holmes Fin. Assocs. v. RTC, 33 F.3d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating
in dicta, "[a]lthough we have no doubts that Congress may override this 'time of
filing' rule if it so chooses,... we believe that there is an even greater need for clear
and affirmative Congressional action when it would do so."); Marquis v. FDIC, 965
F.2d 1148, 1155 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that FIRREA does not require a federal
court's automatic dismissal of claims brought against institution before FDIC was
appointed receiver); Praxis Properties v. Colonial Say. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 63 n.14 (3d
Cir. 1991) (affirming determination of jurisdiction at the time of filing so that the
federal court is not divested of jurisdiction when the RTC becomes receiver during
litigation). But see New Maine Nat'l Bank v. Reef, 765 F. Supp. 763, 765-66 (D. Me.
1991) (interpreting FIRREA provision to give courts discretion to continuejurisdiction of ongoing claim against depository institution after FDIC becomes
receiver).
302. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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still remained after the FDIC sold failed bank assets to a private party
and then exited the litigation.3 1 Faced with only non-diverse parties
and claims based in state law, the minority instead held that the
discretionary approach of the supplemental jurisdiction statute was
appropriate.3 In cases outside the context of private party
purchasers and the FDIC, other courts adopted a similar approach
and applied the supplemental jurisdiction statute to decide cases
where events after the time of filing threatened to unsettle federal
court jurisdiction.' Some courts, such as the Fourth Circuit, even
claimed that the supplemental jurisdiction statute abrogated the time-
of-filing rule.01
The Fourth Circuit, in Shanaghan v. Cahill,"'° held that § 1367
displaced the time-of-filing analysis of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.
v. Red Cab Co.3 11 The court reviewed a district court ruling that
dismissed a case for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiffs aggregated
claims in a diversity action fell below the amount in controversy.1 2
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district
court to apply the supplemental jurisdiction statute.13 The court
reasoned that after dismissal of one of the aggregate claims, the
amount in controversy could not be met, and as a result, "the
jurisdictional basis of the action fade[d] away. 314 Using § 1367(c) the
lower court could exercise its discretion whether to keep or dismiss
the remaining claims.1
The court rejected the time-of-filing rule as overbroad and contrary
to Congress' "emphatic preference for the Gibbs approach," 31 6 which
is a "discretionary determination" informed by "federal policy,
comity, and considerations of judicial economy. 31 7 The court then
considered the virtues of discretion over the vices of a mechanical
rule.318 The court found both a "rigid rule of retention" and a "rigid
rule requiring dismissal" equally undesirable because retention would
flood federal courts with trivial claims and dismissal would be
306. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
307. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
308. See Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying subject
matter jurisdiction when recovery sought by plaintiff fell below amount in
controversy); cf. Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1415, 1416 (N.D. Ala.
1997) (holding that the time-of-filing rule of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. was
overruled by the 1988 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)); Goodman v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. 981 F. Supp. 1083,1084 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (same).
309. See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
310. 58 F.3d 106.
311. See id at 111.
312- See id at 109.
313. See id
314. d at 110.
315. See id
316. Id at 111.




unjust.3 19 The court endorsed a discretionary rule to balance those
extremes.320  The "contemporary congressional view of federal
jurisdiction" embraced the notion of courts balancing convenience,
fairness to both parties and the interests of judicial economy.321 The
court argued that Congress surely had little desire that a mechanical
approach to jurisdiction, of which the time-of-filing rule is an example,
survive the enactment of § 1367.32
The application of § 1367(c) to aggregation cases such as Shanaghan
is arguably inappropriate 321 because "no single claim by itself carried
plaintiff into federal court."324 Section 1367(a) requires first that the
court possess jurisdiction over an original claim.32  Supplemental
jurisdiction then extends to additional claims or parties that derive
from the same nucleus of operative fact as the original claim.326 In
Shanaghan there was only one claim over which the federal court had
subject matter jurisdiction because the aggregated claims were
considered one claim for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction.327
As part of the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project there is a
proposed amendment to § 1367. The Reporter's note to Tentative
Draft 2 of the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project cites the
erroneous Shanaghan decision as part of the impetus for a new §
1367.31s The proposed new version of § 1367 includes a definitional
section that distinguishes a supplemental claim from a claim that
confers original jurisdiction, known as a "freestanding" claim. 39
Likewise, § 1367 was improperly applied by the New Rock court.
Judge McKee authored a dissenting opinion in New Rock and echoed
the critics of the Shanaghan decision when he noted that under the
facts of New Rock, § 1367(a)'s requirements for supplemental
jurisdiction were clearly lacking.330 According to McKee, the New
Rock court first misinterpreted Congress' intent in the enactment of
319. Id. at 111.
320. See id. at 112 ("Justice is better served by a jurisdictional rule that includes
some measure of discretion for the district court.").
321. Id. at 111.
322. See id.
323. See Amanda Dalton, Note, Shanaghan v. Cahill: Supplementing Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 1996 BYU L. Rev. 281, 290 (arguing that each of the individual claims
aggregated to exceed the amount in controversy threshold are not supplemental
claims under § 1367(a)).
324. Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110.
325. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
326. See id.
327. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
328. See ALI, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project 76-77 (T.D. 2) (1998).
329. New § 1367, as proposed by Tentative Draft No. 1 contains a definition that
states in pertinent part: "a freestanding claim is any claim for relief that is within the
original jurisdiction of the district courts independently of the jurisdiction conferred
by this section... ." Id. at 155.
330. See New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc. 101 F.3d
1492, 1512 (3rd. Cir. 1996) (McKee, J., dissenting).
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the supplemental jurisdiction statute.33' The New Rock court
misapplied § 1367(c) because the private party's claim was not an
independent claim with supplemental jurisdiction status separate from
the RTC's claim.3 32 The RTC was no longer a party to the action after
it sold the assets under litigation to the private party."' Jurisdiction
over the remaining claim was not supplemental. Judge McKee noted
that the New Rock opinion was further distorted because it "rel[ies]
upon the very 'Time of Filing' rule that it reject[s] in the first
instance."'3 4 For the court in New Rock, the proper removal by the
FDIC at the time of filing conferred original jurisdiction for
supplemental jurisdiction purposes but could not prevent the
divestment of the FDIC assignee under FIRREA.3 35 The disputed
claim in New Rock failed to fall under the supplemental jurisdiction
statute because the claim of the private party was not an individual
claim separate from the RTC's jurisdiction-conferring claim.-"
Furthermore, the Third Circuit's decision in New Rock to make the
exercise of jurisdiction discretionary is contrary to its finding that once
the RTC was no longer a party to the case subject matter jurisdiction
based on the RTC's federal party status in FIRREA did not survive.Y
V. ARGUMENT
This part illustrates the ways in which the time-of-filing rule
currently offers the most satisfactory method for courts to exercise
federal jurisdiction after the transfer of assets from the FDIC to a
private party takes place. This Note suggests as an alternative
solution that Congress amend FIRREA and confer federal
jurisdiction on these private party purchasers as assignees of the FDIC
to guarantee them the benefits of federal court jurisdiction.
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction should not be considered
solely with regard to the case law that extends the FDIC's common
law D'Oench, Duhme powers to assignees. The Supreme Court has
already expressed its disapproval of the creation of federal common
law.3' In response, the FDIC has also curtailed its use of common law
331. See id at 1513-14 ("I do not think that the Congress intended to allow the
exercise of federal jurisdiction to resolve a uniquely state claim where, as here, the
federal court concludes that it has no original federal jurisdiction.").
332. See id at 1515 n.2 ("[T]he dismissal of the RTC did not cause the federal
claims to 'morph' into state claims.").
333. See id at 1494.
334. Id. at 1514.
335. See id McKee surmised, "[wie are confronted with an error of law arising
from what I believe is an erroneous application of a legal principle occasioned by an
incorrect reading of the supplemental jurisdiction statute." Id.
336. Cf. Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Community Serv. Inc.,
166 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that state law claims aggregated together are
original and individually are not supplemental for the purposes of § 1367).
337. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
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D'Oench, Duhme, and is relying instead on its statutory powers in
FIRREA.3 39 Cases discussed in Part III.A. properly distinguished the
FDIC's federal party status from the rights of assignees to exercise
D'Oench, Duhme common law because the FDIC's federal
jurisdiction is not only the result of a Congressional grant, it is based
upon the FDIC's status as an agency of the United States.340
Although the statute of limitations is a procedural rule, and
therefore more analogous to jurisdiction than the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine, the statute of limitations is still an affirmative defense. 1 By
contrast, parties have no power to consent to a waiver of subject
matter jurisdiction342  The court may examine subject matter
jurisdiction on its own motion, at any time during litigation. The
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) recognizes the constitutional
importance of a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction by granting
the court the authority to do so.
The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources suggests that a federal party's status may be assigned to a
private party for the purpose of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction." However, while Congress clearly referred to private
parties in the False Claims Act, § 1819(b)(2)(A) lacks any language
about private parties.345 The minority courts that have applied the
339. See Statement of Policy, supra note 88. After the Supreme Court's decisions
in O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton brought the expansion of federal common law to
a halt, the FDIC issued a statement of policy containing guidelines for the agency's
use of the common law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. See, e.g., Galves, Might Does Not
Make Right, supra note 6, at 1386-90 (arguing that the FDIC's internal guidelines
should not prevent efforts to reform D'Oench, Duhme). This effort was surely an
attempt to avoid further judicial erosion of the agency's superpower, see Barry Stuart
Zisman, Banks and Thrifts: Government Enforcement and Receivership § 25.02[5] at
25-32 (1991), which the FDIC has called "among the most important, long-standing,
and powerful protections afforded the FDIC." Statement of Policy, supra note 88. It
acknowledged that, "overly aggressive application of the specific requirement of these
legal doctrines could lead to inequitable and inconsistent results in particular cases."
Id. at 5986. The FDIC announced that it would only apply § 1823(e) to "claims that
relate to agreements or arrangements entered into after the effective date of
FIRREA." Id. at 5985. Agreements entered into prior to the effective date of
FIRREA would fall under pre-FIRREA § 1823(e) and the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine. See id. The guidelines however, will not curtail third party entities from
asserting the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine when litigating post-FIRREA agreements.
See Bock, supra note 60, at 986. Uncertainty still remains around the fate of the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine especially now that its fate may be in the hands of private
parties.
340. See supra notes 275-286 and accompanying text.
341. Cf. Woram, supra note 252, at 306 ("[S]tatutes of limitation are shields of
defense....").
342. See Chemerinsky, supra note 114, § 5.1 at 259.
343. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The examination of subject matter jurisdiction is one
of the few matters a court may consider on its own motion. See Chemerinsky, supra
note 114, § 5.1 at 260.
344. See supra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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supplemental jurisdiction statute have done so mistakenly, exceeding
the bounds of Congressional intent. The supplemental jurisdiction
statute deals only with civil actions that consist of multiple claims.-,6
The discretionary factors of § 1367(c) only arise when a court is
deciding whether to decline jurisdiction on a supplemental claim:
Congress would likely need to enact legislation to allow courts to
apply the discretionary Gibbs-Cohill factors of § 1367(c) to determine
whether to exercise jurisdiction after the FDIC transfers assets of a
failed financial institution to a private party and leaves non-diverse
parties asserting state law claims. Enacting a discretionary rule would
permit district court judges to assess the efficiency, economy and
fairness of a remand or possibly a dismissal on a case-by-case basis.
However, a discretionary rule may present more risk to the private
parties that purchase assets from the FDIC because the status of
pending federal court litigation over these assets becomes uncertain.
The market for these questionable assets could shrink as a result and
lead to less of a recovery on these assets for the insurance fund.34
The time-of-filing rule offers a satisfactory solution to the issue of
federal jurisdiction after the FDIC is no longer a party to pending
litigation following a transfer of assets to a third party. Under the
time-of-filing rule, the court's subject matter jurisdiction is settled
according to § 1819(b)(2)(A) of FIRREA, by the presence of the
FDIC as a party to the case. 49 The time-of-filing rule was created as a
bright line rule to encourage "normal business transactions" during
litigation.3 50 This asset sale to private parties is a regular part of the
FDIC's efforts in its capacity as a receiver, conservator or insurer to
maximize the return to a failed bank's creditors and minimize
expenditures out of the insurance fund and the pockets of taxpayers. 5'
Congress sanctions these policy goals in FIRREA."
The minority courts found the time-of-filing rule inapplicable
because they maintained that the rule's only purpose was to deter
manipulative behavior by parties.35 3 When the FDIC transfers its
assets to a private party during the course of ongoing litigation,
application of the time-of-filing rule may prevent manipulative
346. See supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 308-37 and accompanying text.
348. Cf. Woram, supra note 252, at 304 ("Once an asset might lose the protection in
a purchaser's hands, its value declines in the FDIC's hands.").
349. See, eg., CIT, Inc. v. 170 Willow St. Assocs., 93 Civ. 1201 (CSH), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12844 at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1997) (citing cases that apply time-of-
filing rule).
350. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426,428-29 (1991) (per
curiam).
351. See supra notes 54-86 and accompanying text.
352- See Woram, supra note 252, at 301.
353. But see CIT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12844 at *22-*23 (declaring "the need to




behavior on the part of the debtor whose motive for challenging
jurisdiction could be to win a dismissal and avoid having the case
judged on the merits.35"
Rather than simply relying on courts to uniformly apply the time-
of-filing rule, Congress should amend § 1819(b) to make an explicit
grant of federal jurisdiction to assignees of the FDIC. Although
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has rejected the time-of-
filing rule, unless the Supreme Court elects to resolve this split in
authority, courts can continue to apply this judge-made rule
selectively. Since the time-of-filing rule has neither a statutory basis
nor is it a constitutional rule, Congress may legislate a different
approach.3 5 Congress' grant of FDIC jurisdiction is based upon the
FDIC's status as a federal agency. The Supreme Court's decision in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources suggests that a federal party's
status may be assigned without running afoul of Article 111.356
By extending federal jurisdiction to these asset purchasers,
Congress can guarantee the benefits of certainty and efficiency
provided by the time-of-filing rule to transactions between the private
party purchasers and the FDIC. As assignees, private party
purchasers can avoid the inconvenience and expense of defending
challenges to federal court jurisdiction, and lower overall transaction
costs. Such certainty will advance the FDIC's goals to recover the
most value from assets of failed depository institutions, maintaining a
solvent insurance fund to preserve public confidence in the banking
industry. 7
A legislative grant of jurisdiction to FDIC private party purchasers
can also serve purposes related to federal court jurisdiction. If
Congress grants private party purchasers federal jurisdiction,
Congress can make certain that federal courts will exercise their
discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute only when the
requirements of § 1367(a) are met. In addition, legislation that
contains a clear statement of jurisdiction for FDIC asset purchasers
would likewise deter unwanted expansion of the FDIC's federal
common law.359
354. Cf Wright et al., supra note 165, § 3608 at 452. ("[I]f jurisdiction could be
destroyed by a party moving to the opposing party's state after commencement, then
whenever either litigant believed he might lose on the merits he could terminate the
action by becoming a citizen of the other party's home state.").
355. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
356. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
357. See, e.g., Galves, Might Does Not Make Right, supra note 6 at 1339-41
(discussing role of FDIC).
358. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
359. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
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CONCLUSION
The FDIC exercises enhanced statutory and common law powers in
litigation to fulfill its role as an insurer to the deposits of national and
state banks and thrifts. Whenever the FDIC is a party to a civil
action, it has the advantage of federal court jurisdiction under §
1819(b)(2)(A) of FIRREA. Some federal courts faced challenges to
their jurisdiction on the theory that when private parties succeeded to
the FDIC as a party to ongoing litigation, they failed to satisfy
requirements for federal jurisdiction independent of the FDIC.
The majority of courts follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
decision in FSLIC v. GriffinW by relying on the FDIC case law of
common law D'Oench, Duhme and the time-of-filing rule to hold that
a private party that purchases assets from the FDIC may remain in
federal court despite the FDIC's departure from the litigation.-" By
contrast, the Third Circuit in New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred
Entity Advancements, Inc. took a discretionary approach by invoking
the supplemental jurisdiction statute.3 The majority courts properly
invoke the time-of-filing rule, while the minority courts erroneously
rely on § 1367(a). Instead of relying on courts to apply the time-of-
filing rule, Congress should go a step further and enact legislation to
confer federal court jurisdiction to these private party purchasers in
order to accomplish the objectives of FIRREA and to designate
clearly the scope of its jurisdictional grant.
360. 935 F.2d 691, 696 (5th Cir. 1991).
361. See discussion supra Part III.A.
362. 101 F.3d 1492, 1504-11 (3d Cir. 1996).
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